stupid questions IIc
May 2023–June 2023
Continued from:
Twitter thread here:
Vaguely: what’s the prior that anything that happens, was likely to happen? The two streams of thought flowing into this question are the “Death Note bits of anonymity loss Gwern essay” analogy to moments in Napoleon’s invasion of Russia that lost him the most % chance of a good outcome, & the Duncan Watts paper about repeat rerunning music markets with runaway winner take all effects to get different outcomes from no initial quality differences; basically, is any given thing that happened usually just extremely unlikely, and thus catastrophic bad outcomes are usually rare bad luck and don’t happen in more than a handful of “reruns”? Or not?
So not only do we have no idea if year X AI model is conscious and has ~*qualia*~, we don’t even have any idea how we would know? This was theoretical before but less so every year. [May 2023]
Noticing the dissonance that:
-Parenting environment having ~no long term effect on adult personality, life outcomes, etc; “the phenotype eventually achieves itself”
and
-All the bread and butter cute TED Talk psychology results summarized in Thinking Fast and Slow about priming walking speed with old people words, power posing, teaching grit in schools, etc.:
are *both* really implausible as assessed by common sense and cultural expectations, but the former is basically true and the latter is basically nonsense (it now appears). So “that sounds wrong” or “seems like BS” isn’t really a good guide; some things are bizarre but true, and you just get used to them.
Uncomfortably, this exact point was the defense of the claims in the second category above, in response to “that sounds made up”. Kahneman “you have no choice but to believe it” (paraphrased).Were 19th century growth rates continuous with a longer accelerating growth trend? The stylized fact in my cache is that Europe was in a slowly growing but basically malthusian environment (small secular rate w/ cyclic gyrations above and below trend), with small boosts from tinkering, improved institutions, the industrious revolution and, earlier, larger one-time boost from New World crop imports; and then the industrial revolution happens relatively suddenly and lurches average annual growth to a new, higher rate. This also makes sense qualitatively; history *looks* pretty similar in 1500s, 1600s, 1700s, with some almost cosmetic differences here and there, and suddenly things start to look different very quickly and by the 1900s it’s like another planet.
What are the biggest stylized differences between dinosaur ecosystems and mammal ecosystems?
Why are nuclear vehicles limited to carriers and submarines? Both are military-only, so is it more a matter of nuclear aversion than cost/benefit? Or it wouldn’t be worth it even in a nuclear-engineering-friendly world? Huge container ships are around the size of carriers. Maybe no land vehicle gets big enough, although there are miniature reactors.
Vague memory of a proposal for nuclear-powered nuclear bombers that could circle the north pole perpetually; nice idea but redundant with just staggered refueling among a fleet of conventional bombers (and w/ ICBMs, maybe obsolete).
Half related: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Plowshare[‘Let all ignorant of everything enter here’ is the energy here] Plato thesis, Conway antithesis, synthesis this collection. The joke about the Hegelian progression of James Scott’s research interests.
A sensible question but I don’t know how we would answer it; it seems deep in “who knows” territory. Maybe someone with a really deep qualitative knowledge of what Berthier did + what other general staffs did + how competent the next-best Berthier would have been ; too much changed in the 100 Days to infer much from that seeming A/B test, I think.
There’s a lot of truth to this, but could separate it into two dimensions of: how hard was it for the world-conquering great man to grab the reins of an existing state machine e.g. (Alexander < Octavian < Napoleon < Tamerlane/Genghis Khan?) and how much did they distinctly improve or “wins above replacement” with that machine; not sure how much the sudden cyclonic concentrations of steppe/desert/plains tribal coalition power were more like an ecological wave cresting that happened to crystallize around any one originating cell vs. how much the qualities of that cell caused out of sample, nonreplaceable explosive growth. There’s a lot I don’t know, basically. Not sure Octavian and Napoleon are in the right order either. Octavian started closer but had to win a civil war first, depending on if you count that as “before” or “after”; Napoleon had to win a lot with the Army of Italy, do “fine” in Egypt and then was picked 3rd for 18 Brumaire but the first two choices were unavailable.
Why isn’t twitter flooded with LLM conversation bots by now?
-technically harder than it looks
-costs $, no one bothered
-it is but I’m mostly in a pre-LLM discourse web, a blessed information bubble
-it is but they’re just that good
-other
[May 2023]How many different formulations of opportunity cost are there?
Which single discoveries have added the most information?
What’s the difference between square (Atlantic) and triangular (Indian Ocean, ?Mediterranean) sails?
Associated ships are deep-bottomed, seaworthy in the former and flat/galleylike/hugging coast in latter.
There was a plague outbreak around 1800 during the French invasion of Egypt, why didn’t this (or other related outbreaks) ever re-expose Europe to plague pandemics? Better quarantine measures to snuff it out? Some genetic changes either by Europeans or by plague? Just luck?
How does “stopping up wells” work, is it much harder for an army to dig a well in a known location than it sounds? Is it just a time wasting measure rather than a real denial of water? Maybe the wells are also hidden?
Descriptions in the Battle of Badr and in various Muslim vs. Byzantine and Muslim vs. Sassanid battles describe pre-battle duel tournament between champions from both armies; was this odd custom a Middle Eastern thing? Or more widespread? When did it die out?
(A description in Thucydides of a battle of 300 champions between armies, but this was notable for how it usually didn’t happen; and anyway the results weren’t honored)The costs of the route were mostly determined by which route was available at all in the current geopolitical configuration of Portuguese, Ottomans, Indian & Central Asian states and statelets but: with both routes open, what was the efficiency differential of transport (Silk Road vs. around Africa)?
Does brain size selection runaway only happen in the presence of a sort of gently sloped gradient in design space where metabolic cost & other design costs of huge brains and heads can immediately pay dividends by grabbing extended phenotypes out of the environment—tools for melee and ranged weapons, and fire for extended gut being the two most important and easily accessible. In other words, do sudden spurts of brain growth only ever pay off when they coexist with hands? (Which have to have evolved for other reasons and then be exapted?) And without this onramp more expensive brains keep starving to death first & the growth rate arrests?
Why is counting letters for transformers like crosses for vampires? [May 2023]
How could this happen
Why is North Korea so unusually long-lived for such a harsh regime? Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, Khmer Rouge Cambodia... Reign of Terror France... all achieved similar heights of atrocity, but drifted back into relative normalcy. 3 of those 4 for internal/endogenous reasons;
-what mix of internal and external factors are different here-‘what would be the decades-long internal evolution of Third Reich Europe/would there be a Deng of Nazi Germany’ another of those ‘history Qs’
Big picture, why did the UK hold onto India but not colonial America? (Former with much higher population, and further away). Was it partly an issue of priority and cost/benefit, in the sense that they tried harder?
How did battlefield surrender in the Napoleonic era work, especially with battles with huge ratios of captured to killed. Probably it worked one way at a regiment+ level and another at battalion- level. Did individual soldiers surrender? Officers of a group? Were there commissars to punish surrender attempts?
It seems like (on the Battle of Quebec and Trafalgar respectively, not clear if in general) the British Navy would fire individually (after first volley) and French in volleys, while with the army it was the reverse. Why? And what tradeoffs?
Why did these later plague outbreaks never wipe out Europe as a whole to the same extent? I feel like they’re too far apart in time for there to be much immunity; did they just get better at quarantine and containment?
What were the most besieged cities after Jerusalem; Constantinople?
It seems like two of the three most important battles of the 3rd coalition, Trafalgar and Ulm, were almost singularly “caused” by individual top-level command incompetence; not that the respective sides didn’t have enduring advantages/disadvantages corresponding to their 1 sided victory (France on land and Britain at sea, respectively) or that the result wouldn’t have happened another way, but, zooming in on that battle & its prelude and individual command decisions that could have gone differently, or even “normally”, it feels like those leaders were worth “-40,000 troops”, as Napoleon was said to be worth +40,000. Which raises some broader questions left as an exercise to the reader.
[Ulm: endless vacillation, army essentially outmaneuvered and entirely beaten without getting to fight at all, by army of similar size, also without escaping either; Trafalgar: in a world historical level of “things you don’t want your subordinate commander to do”, the French admiral decides to fight a decisive battle after the need has passed (the army of the channel has moved on (because that admiral messed up earlier, not clearing the way for them)), because he learned he was about to be fired for incompetence (lol), and so he iacta’d the alea, with results that would become the famous event we all know today]
Why didn’t ships of the line in age of sail experiment with metal armor plating? Too heavy and slow without steam? Too expensive? Mast/rigging/sails still vulnerable (French practice to aim there, vs. British at hull). Korean turtle ships show some version is possible, in limited/coastal form at least. (And what about in the Mediterranean)
Maybe it wasn’t any one of those factors but the combined weight of them; given how obvious an idea it was, and the Royal Navy’s general high level of competence, they must have experimented with it. Given the chaos of battles and the clumsiness of ships, plus the chance of attack from multiple directions, it seems very hard to assume armor is facing the right way even with competent captain and crew—“why weren’t the backs of ships more heavily armored” is then another Q. Maybe comes down to weight? Story of officers throwing their personal belongings overboard before Trafalgar to get the small % weight reduction, like fighter jets dropping their fuel tanks.Many Napoleonic battles (off the top of my head Lodi, Arcole... crossing the Berezina... Leipzig... Friedland) involved fighting across a bridge, or retreating over one, as a key or decisive moment; by WW1 I think this didn’t happen at all, because firepower made it impossible. But it’s the same riverine West European terrain, so... what did the contested river crossings look like, then.
In which era was it the worst to be a sailor on a warship? (the Face of Naval Battle question)
Two general ???:
-I don’t really “get” the Battle of Poltava
-Early career Rommel apparently captured 9000 Italian troops with 150 of his own soldiers and basically no losses... hard to understand.
Very basic optics confusion: once vision gets augmented by telescopes and binoculars, does eyesight still make a difference?
For e.g., two ships observing each other from their tallest point with equivalent spyglass tech; does the spotter with slightly better vision still see further? By resolving the blur at the edge of spyglass range more clearly... but that seems like a different kind of visual acuity than resolving distant objects, as well… in conclusion: ???
Which events in history sound the most totally made up, an interesting exercise.
scraps of DNA, single individual artifacts.
-inferring huge amount of information about vanished ecosystems millions of years ago, again from scattered, fragmentary, single data points
-for literate agrarian era we have overlapping and crosshatching lines of evidence from genetic evidence, artifacts, archaeological digs, coinage, pollution traces in ice cores, disease and health information from burials, contemporaneous written records, and *actual written historical accounts*. Okay, there isn’t full coverage panoptical survey data; we don’t have exact data on equites equo suo vs. equo publico. But compared to what we get from order of magnitude worse data on earlier epochs, we can probably infer a LOT.
How much more resilient would Tsarist Russia (and Weimar Germany) have been if they made a habit of executing their extreme revolutionaries instead of giving them short-to-medium prison sentences, as their descendent regimes did (notable how all of Hitler, Stalin, Lenin previously arrested and/or exiled)? (the Sulla->Caesar->Octavian question; or the Reign of Terror->Thermidor->Brumaire question...). Was there a meaningful human capital restriction on motivated individuals trying to overthrow the government? Or would demand create its own supply, for the most part.
What’s the meaning of this joke
If you rerun the history of earth 1 million times from 15kya with no sheep or goats, in how many of those earths are horses hunted to extinction before being domesticated.
How much damage did the Great Purge do to the soviet army? Ideally as a %.
Related trivia question would be what’s the highest rank at which Nazis killed more Soviet officers than the Communists did.Related counterfactual: if US just severed all ties with Europe in late 1943 (don’t ask questions), would the USSR have been a) able and b) willing to go all the way to the Atlantic and unify the Continent under the red banner? Or do they still just stop in Germany. i.e., was the main counterfactual effect of D-Day to keep Europe free from communism, rather than Nazism.
Friedland looks a lot like a mirror image of Aspern-Essling; smaller force caught crossing with its back to a river and pinned against it on three sides by a larger force; but Napoleon managed to retreat back across the Danube with 7k dead/16k wounded against 4k/16k Austrians, a loss but not a decisive one, whereas Friedland was a devastating rout for Bennigsen. Why such different outcomes?
Could ask the more general question, when do armies in this era try to pursue after a victory, vs. not; having cavalry helps a lot; nightfall often seems to break off pursuit; Napoleon unusually aggressive in pursuing defeated armies to decisive result; but why didn’t others copy?
Three questions:
1. How much was WW1 a “dry brush overhang” of a fully industrial age European war that was basically guaranteed to happen at least once, over something, in the next 30 years; i.e. running the European state system 1 million times from 1900... vs. not being that; likewise what % of wars end up as short sharp shocks that readjust some territory but don’t lead to massive devastation or unstable peace; and
2. What form does the increasingly obvious possibility of the development of nuclear weapons, and then the ensuing nuclear arms race, take in a world where they weren’t rushed into production as soon as possible in the context of a wartime crash program? Presumably there are still hostile armed blocs in this world so nuclear arms race still happens, but...
3. How much does lack of general European war also suppress communist revolutions, as Russian communist state was the darling child of German invasion, Chinese communism of Japanese invasion knocking out their nationalist rivals... other examples... and then a “Concert of Europe” for the 1900s and Asia as well, keep communist revolutions suppressed; vs. them just happening anyway.
“?”: I’d view Tsushima as more an effect than a cause of Japanese naval dominance over Russia in the 1900s; it was nice to get in early but Japan was industrializing fast and [close to homeland] + [navy] was way more vital than [remote eastern province] + [need enormous European land army] in terms of respective state capacity. Unless a decisive loss in Russo-Japanese war either put Japan off expansion permanently (how?) or halted their modernization and industrialization, and given the lack of any equivalent driven efficient modernizing tendency in the Russian fleet + the need to operate fleets in three theaters + having other unignoreable strategic priorities vs. home navy being Japan's #1, I think Japan still surpasses Russia in the region no matter what.
Irresolvable question is how much the prestige and demonstration of the successful Russian revolution inspired copycats elsewhere.
“Can Russia hold onto a far Eastern empire and/or anti-Japanese defensive alliance if they either win decisively, or pull out a draw in 1905”: imo no, but it’s tough to make predictions, especially about the past.
Can LLMs translate any book now? [June 2023]
What is it like to be a tetrachromat, basically.
What does it mean when a GPT is quantized?
re: rainbolt:
Why nature’s inordinate fondness for beetles. What does it see in them
Why did Ottoman armies start losing constantly after the Siege of Vienna?
What was Eugene’s influence on Napoleon?
(some brainstorming at thread)
I don’t really understand how the “Wuhan virology researchers were the patient approximately zero through three” information can come out now, but not any time in the intervening three years. It must have been known immediately, and somewhat widely—including intelligence agencies outside China. Why not before? Say, only two years after the origin of covid? How was the information kept secret? (but then now released)









































On 223:
Small reactors are bad for square-cube reasons.
Shielding is just too heavy for road vehicles, even something like a main battle tank.
Even trains have their load limits exceeded by reactor shielding - trains can carry a lot but it needs to be spread over many axles, whereas the reactor shields have to be concentrated in one place. Plus derailments are scary. The soviets studied this with the NS400 and gave up. Also if this was viable you probably just build catenaries powered by nuclear power stations and run electric locomotives.
Having to rebuild your whole supply chain to allow for nuclear servicing is annoying, even though you don’t need to refuel.
There is no demand for nuclear-powered aircraft because, again, the reactor is too heavy for commercial applications and the military applications are obsoleted by SLBMs, which can reach anywhere a nuclear bomber can reach, can loiter for much longer due to food stores, and are really really hard to detect.
The nuclear navy did exist with all the nuclear cruisers etc in the 60s and 70s, but this took Rickover to make it happen.
But the main reason it was retired, I think, was that the vessel either needs a super high price tag or a super long life to make the economics work. For a frigate with a 20 year lifespan, you end up spending 3-4 years in the middle with it in dry dock doing refuelling, and the upfront cost just doesn’t pencil out. Modern commercial freighters also have a lifespan around 20-25 yrs, don’t care about having to surface to run generators like subs, and don’t really care about going very fast for hours at a time like carriers.
This is not so true anymore, but in the 20thC you needed highly trained personnel to operate the reactor who needed to be paid well. Navy nukes are famously selected for intelligence, half of Rickover’s job seems like it was producing this class of people.
One problem with the NS Savannah (US nuclear freighter) was that there was constant conflict between the deck officers and the nuclear guys because the latter were paid a lot more.
Other problems: Savannah was built to aura farm and not max out cargo economics, it was retired just before the oil crisis in the 70s, there has never been a commoditised supply chain for mobile reactors - again, Rickover was the only one who could make this work, and even he didn’t get unit costs low enough for the private sector to be really interested. Even if they were, there’s certification, national security…
Nuclear icebreakers worked, but only for the Soviets.
Savannah was, empirically, safe but still faced a lot of pushback e.g. countries like Japan not allowing it to dock because of public perception.
Edit: also, plowshare doesn’t work because ground bursts generate insane amounts of fallout, even with hypothetical ultra-clean warheads like Ripple: https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-abstract/23/2/133/101892/Ripple-An-Investigation-of-the-World-s-Most?redirectedFrom=fulltext
I looked into that last year because I was wondering if you could solve climate change by doing rock weathering with Ripple warheads, but even three to four nines of fusion still produces lethal amounts of fallout IIRC